Dignity and the Political Right to Freedom by Fagan, Anton
Dignity and the Political Right to Freedom
ANTON FAGAN*
University of Cape Town
In the case of Ferreira v Levin NO, Justice Laurie Ackermann seemed to
make the assumption that the political right to freedom is best explained,
and its content therefore best determined, by the fact that all human
beings have dignity.1 That is, he seemed to assume that dignity and the
fact that human beings necessarily possess it provide the key to an
understanding of the political right to freedom. This is, I think, an
assumption made by many. The aim of this essay is to question its validity.
Let me concede straight away that it is possible to provide a
dignity-based explanation of the political right to freedom. One way of
doing so is as follows:
(1) All human beings have dignity – either because they are human or
because, being human, they possess some dignity-conferring prop-
erty, such as rational agency.
(2) To have dignity is, as Kant explains in the Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals, to have ‘intrinsic value’.2
(3) Because human beings have intrinsic value, they have equal value.
This is so either because the intrinsic value of human beings is
incomparable or because the reason for human beings having
intrinsic value, for example their rational agency, entails that all have
it to the same degree.
(4) Because human beings have equal value, governments are under a
duty to treat their subjects with equal respect. Governments are
under a duty to treat their subjects with respect because their
subjects, as human beings, have value, and respect is the appropriate
response to anything of value. Since a government’s subjects all have
equal value, the respect due to each must be equal respect.
(5) Because governments are under a duty to treat their subjects with
equal respect, they are under a duty to remain neutral between their
subjects’ differing conceptions of the good life, that is, of what gives
value to life. For a government does not treat two subjects with
equal respect if it prefers one’s conception of the good life to that of
the other.
(6) Because governments are under a duty to remain neutral between
subjects’ conceptions of the good life, they are under a duty to
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refrain from imposing costs (such as incarceration, fines, the stigma
of criminalisation, possibly even taxation) on the choices and
activities of their subjects, on the basis that those choices and
activities lack value.
(7) The correlative of this latter duty is the political right to freedom.
The dignity-based explanation of the political right to freedom, as I
have just set it out, should be a familiar one. Ronald Dworkin adopted an
explanation more or less along these lines in his essay ‘Liberalism’.3
Whether Ackermann J had this kind of dignity-based explanation in
mind in his Ferreira judgment is less clear, for he placed less emphasis on
the intermediate notion of ‘equal respect’ and more on that of
‘self-realisation’.4 However, since it seems to me to be the most
compelling among the dignity-based explanations of the political right to
freedom, I will use it as my foil in the discussion that follows.
If, as I have conceded and in fact just demonstrated, it is possible to
provide a dignity-based explanation of the political right to freedom,
how can I possibly object to such an explanation? I can object to it
because some explanations are better than others. They are better if they
better reveal or illuminate the central features of the object that they aim
to explain. In my view, the dignity-based explanation of the political
right to freedom is for this very reason a poor explanation. It fails to
capture what is at the heart of the political right to freedom. It fails to
show why the political right to freedom matters, as much as it does, to
those who hold it. Let me put this metaphorically. It is possible to follow
a path that starts at dignity, which passes by equality of respect and
neutrality between conceptions of the good, and which ends up at the
political right to freedom. It is possible to walk that walk to freedom. But
it is, if I may coin a phrase, ‘the wrong walk to freedom’. It is the wrong
walk to freedom because it does not account for the fact that we care
about freedom as much as we do.
Some people may object to the dignity-based explanation on the
ground that it gives the wrong content to the political right to freedom.
As Ackermann J accepted in the Ferreira judgment, the dignity-based
explanation tends to restrict the political right to freedom to negative
freedom, that is, to freedom from state interference.5 However, this is not
an objection that I will raise. I will not raise it because it begs the
question. It may of course be true that the political right to freedom is
best understood as a right not only to negative, but also to positive,
freedom. But if that is true, it is true by virtue of the fact that the best
3 In R Dworkin A Matter of Principle (1986) at 181.
4 Ferreira v Levin NO (n 1) at 1013H–14B.
5 Ibid at 1016D, 1018F–19A.
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explanation of the political right to freedom entails or supports it. It is
true, in other words, only if the dignity-based explanation is a poor one.
To attack the dignity-based explanation by assuming that the political
right to freedom must be a right to positive and not merely negative
freedom, is thus to put the cart before the horse.
The point of departure for my objection to the dignity-based
explanation is the nature of political rights. A person has a right if one or
more of his interests warrant or justify the imposition of a duty or duties
on others. Rights, that is, protect interests through the imposition of
duties.6 It follows that, if persons have a political right to freedom, it is
because they have some interest or interests that warrant the imposition
of certain duties on the government or state. The problem with the
dignity-based explanation of the political right to freedom is that the
political right to freedom, so explained, seems to protect a rather queer
interest.
What is that interest? In other words, what interest does the political
right to freedom protect, if the dignity-based explanation is a sound one?
It cannot be an interest in dignity per se. The dignity-based explanation
supposes that a person’s dignity cannot be diminished, even less
extinguished. But if a person’s dignity cannot be diminished, if nothing
anyone does can affect how much dignity one has, then one’s dignity is
not in need of protection. Of course, if one’s dignity is not in need of
protection, then it cannot be the aim of the political right to freedom to
protect one’s interest in one’s dignity.
If the dignity-based explanation is a sound one, the interest protected
by the political right to freedom is not an interest in any property
possessed or potentially possessed by the holders of that right. It is,
instead, an interest in how others – specifically the government or state –
behave towards the holders of the right. It is an interest in being treated in
the way that accords with one’s dignity or intrinsic value, namely with
respect. To put it in the negative, it is an interest in not being treated with
contempt or, more simply, in not being insulted, by others.
To simplify matters, let us call this interest, that is the interest protected
by the political right to freedom if the dignity-based explanation is a
sound one, one’s ‘dignitary’ interest. And let me emphasise again that this
interest, that is one’s dignitary interest, is not an interest in having dignity.
Nor is it an interest in the non-diminution of one’s dignity. It is rather an
6 I am aware that I am here taking sides in the ongoing dispute between proponents of the
so-called ‘interest theory’, and the so-called ‘will theory’, of rights. This is not the place to
defend my partisanship to the former. For a compelling exposition and defence of the interest
theory, see J Raz The Morality of Freedom (1986) at 165–92. See also M H Kramer,
N E Simmonds and H Steiner A Debate over Rights (1998).
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interest in having others behave in a way that is appropriate to one’s
having dignity, namely with respect or without contempt.
There is something odd about the idea that the political right to
freedom aims to protect one’s dignitary interest. To grasp the oddity of
this idea, consider first an example from the South African law of delict.
According to the South African law of delict, one commits a delict
vis-à-vis another if one assaults him, wrongfully arrests or imprisons him,
maliciously prosecutes him, defames him, insults him or invades his
privacy. On the face of it, these delicts are very different in nature. Yet the
South African law of delict regards all of them as being of a kind. All, that
is, are iniuriae.
What constitutes these divergent delicts a single kind? Why are all
iniuriae? One explanation is that they all involve contumelia. That is, a
person committing any one of these delicts treats his victim with
contempt or without respect. Notwithstanding their obvious differences,
the delicts of assault, defamation and invasion of privacy thus are of a kind
because they all share the same aim, namely to protect people’s interest in
not being treated contumeliously, their interest, in other words, in being
treated with respect.
While an appeal to the notion of contumelia provides a possible way of
unifying the iniuriae, it is not a particularly good way of doing so. It is of
course true that the iniuriae have in common the fact that a person
committing any one of them treats his victim contumeliously or with
contempt. But it is false that contempt, or contumelia, provides the glue
that cements the divergent iniuriae into a single kind. It is false, in
particular, that what unifies the various iniuriae is that they all aim to
protect people’s interest in not being treated contumeliously.
Consider, for example, the iniuria of assault. Can it really be so that the
point of the iniuria of assault is to protect people from being insulted?
Admittedly, a person committing assault does treat his victim with
contempt. But he does so, surely, only because he disregards his victim’s
interest (or right) to physical integrity. At the heart of the iniuria of assault,
therefore, lies the interest in one’s body or corpus. It is that interest, the
interest in one’s corpus, not the interest in not being insulted, that the
iniuria of assault aims to protect. True, the iniuria of assault does protect
people against insult. But protection against insult is not the iniuria’s aim.
It is merely a necessary by-product, a fortunate side-effect, of the
protection that it affords the interest in bodily integrity.
Just as it is a mistake to try to explain the unity of the iniuriae by
invoking the fact that they all involve contumelia, so it is a mistake to try to
explain the political right to freedom by appealing to the fact that it
protects people’s dignitary interest. Yes, the political right to freedom
does protect people’s dignitary interest – just like the iniuria of assault
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protects their interest in not being treated contumeliously. But the
protection of one’s dignitary interest is not the aim of the political right to
freedom – no more than the avoidance of contumelia is the aim of the
iniuria of assault. The fact that the political right to freedom protects one’s
dignitary interest is simply a fortunate by-product of the protection that it
affords to an altogether different interest.
I will get to the nature of that interest in a moment. But first I want to
present two further examples, both whereof provide further support for
the claim that it is not one’s dignitary interest that lies at the heart of the
political right to freedom. They are both taken from Joseph Raz’s book,
The Morality of Freedom.7
The Man in the Pit. A person falls down a pit and remains there for the rest of
his life, unable to climb out or to summon help. There is just enough ready
food to keep him alive without (after he gets used to it) any suffering. He can
do nothing much, not even move much. His choices are confined to whether
to eat now or a little later, whether to sleep now or a little later, whether to
scratch his left ear or not.
The Hounded Woman. A person finds herself on a small desert island. She shares
the island with a fierce carnivorous animal which perpetually hunts for her.
Her mental stamina, her intellectual ingenuity, her will power and her
physical resources are taxed to their limits by her struggle to remain alive. She
never has a chance to do or even to think of anything other than how to
escape from the beast.
How does consideration of these two examples support the contention
that the political right to freedom is not essentially concerned with the
protection of one’s dignitary interest? Well, it is natural to describe the
circumstances of both the man in the pit and the hounded woman by
saying that they are not free. It is also obvious that both have an interest in
having their circumstances changed: the man has an interest in getting
out of the pit, the woman has an interest in getting off the island. Since, as
we have said, their circumstances can be described by saying that they are
not free, their interest in having those circumstances changed can be
described by saying that they have an interest in being freed, or simply in
being free. But what is that interest? For the moment, let us restrict
ourselves to what it cannot be. It cannot be a dignitary interest. It cannot
be an interest in how others behave towards them. In particular, it cannot
be an interest in being treated with respect or without contempt.
If it is not one’s dignitary interest which lies at the heart of one’s
political right to freedom, what interest does? The answer to that
question is to be found, again, in Raz’s The Morality of Freedom. The
interest that lies at the heart of the political right to freedom is one’s
7 Raz (n 6) at 373–74.
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interest in an autonomous life. According to Raz, a person leads an
autonomous life in so far as he determines the shape of his life through his
own choices. As Raz puts it:8
The ruling idea behind the ideal of personal autonomy is that people should
make their own lives. The autonomous person is a (part) author of his own
life. The ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to
some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions
throughout their lives.
One’s interest in an autonomous life is different in nature to one’s
dignitary interest. One’s dignitary interest, as was explained above, is an
interest in how other people behave towards one. One’s interest in an
autonomous life, by contrast, is an interest in one’s life having a particular
character or quality. Precisely because of this difference, the man in the
pit’s interest in getting out of the pit and the hounded woman’s interest in
getting off the island, which, as we have said, can properly be described as
their interest in freedom, can be their interest in an autonomous life but
not their dignitary interest.
The argument so far establishes that one’s primary interest in freedom
is one’s interest in an autonomous life rather than one’s dignitary interest.
Freedom matters mainly because its absence entails the impossibility of an
autonomous life. It does not matter, or matters only marginally, because
its absence entails that one has been insulted or treated with contempt:
for it is possible to lack freedom even though one has never been insulted
or treated with contempt by anyone. Is this enough to show that the
dignity-based explanation of the political right to freedom is a poor one?
Not quite.
Rights, to recall, protect interests through the imposition of duties.
The discussion so far has focused on the interests protected by the
political right to freedom. It has shown that the political right to freedom
cannot be understood to be aimed at protecting one’s dignitary interest.
Instead, it should be understood to be aimed at protecting one’s interest
in an autonomous life. However, that falls short of showing that dignity
has no role to play in an explanation of the political right to freedom. It is
not sufficient, for persons to have a political right to freedom, that they
have an interest in being free. In addition, their interest in freedom must
warrant or justify the imposition of duties on government or the state.
Could it not be the case that people’s interest in freedom warrants or
justifies the imposition of duties on government or the state only because
the state has a duty to respect them? In short, even if dignity fails to
explain the interest-aspect of the political right to freedom, could it not
have a role in explaining its duty-aspect?
8 Ibid at 369.
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Before answering that question, I should point out that this attempt to
smuggle dignity in through the back-door of duty – the attempt to get it
in through the front-door of protected interests having failed – might not
get those who support the dignity-based explanation what they want.
Most supporters of the dignity-based explanation, I think, want dignity
to explain not only the existence but also the content of the political right
to freedom. They want it to explain not just why people’s interest in
freedom warrants or justifies the imposition of duties on government or
the state, but what those duties are. For dignity to do that, for it to
determine the content of the political right to freedom, it must be one of
the interests which the right aims to protect. For there is no way to
determine the content of a right, there is no way to determine the duties
justified or warranted by a right, other than by considering the interest
which the right aims to protect. To give up the idea that the political right
to freedom aims to protect our dignitary interest is thus to give up the
idea that dignity has a part to play in determining the content of that
right.
However, the answer to the question posed a moment ago is in any
event a negative one. Dignity no more has a role to play in explaining the
duty-aspect of the political right to freedom than it has a role to play in
explaining its interest-aspect. It might be that a person’s interests justify
the imposition of duties on other persons only because we all have a duty to
respect each other. It might be, therefore, that dignity has a crucial role to
play in explaining the rights, including the right to freedom, that persons
have against other persons. But political morality is not inter-personal
ethics writ large. Unlike the relationship between me and my neigh-
bours, the relationship between my government and me is one of
authority. That is a critical difference. A government’s authority over its
subjects is legitimate in so far as it serves their interests. People’s interests
therefore justify the imposition of duties on governments, not because
governments have to treat their subjects with the respect that their
dignity or intrinsic value demands, but because a government that is not
subject to those duties would lack legitimate authority.
I will conclude this essay by returning to a point made near its start,
when discussing what I rejected as a question-begging objection to the
dignity-based explanation of the political right to freedom. The
objection, to recall, was that the dignity-based explanation gives the
wrong content to the political right to freedom, because it restricts it to
negative freedom. As I said earlier, it may indeed be true that the political
right to freedom is best understood as a right not only to negative, but
also to positive, freedom. But if it is true, it is true by virtue of the fact that
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the best explanation of the political right to freedom entails or supports it.
It is true, in other words, only if the dignity-based explanation is a poor
one.
I have tried to show that the dignity-based explanation is a poor one,
and that the political right to freedom is better explained as aimed at
protecting our interest in leading autonomous lives. If I am right, if what
lies at the heart of the political right to freedom is autonomy rather than
dignity, what implications, if any, does that have for the content of the
political right to freedom? If Joseph Raz is to be believed, then what
follows is that the political right to freedom is best understood not, as
Ackermann J suggested in the Ferreira case, as a right merely to negative
freedom, but as a right also to positive freedom.9 As Raz explains, since
an autonomous life is one determined by one’s choices, it is self-
contradictory to suppose that one can make a person lead an autonomous
life. The duties on government which are justified by people’s interest in
an autonomous life are at best, therefore, duties to provide or create the
conditions in which people are able to lead autonomous lives, if they so
choose. Those conditions certainly include the conditions of negative
freedom: for a person cannot have an autonomous life if his choices are
constrained. But they also include some conditions of positive freedom.
A person’s life was not autonomous unless it could have been different,
unless there were available to him options which he chose not to pursue.
People’s interest in autonomy thus justifies an obligation on their
government, not merely to refrain from constraining their choices, but
also to make available to them a variety of options from which to choose.
In sum, an autonomy-based conception of the political right to freedom
is a conception not merely of negative, but also of positive, freedom.
9 Ibid at 407–12.
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